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Introduction
Throughout

the 1970s and early 1980s, increasing positive balances on the

services account provided a substantial offset to negative balances in merchandise
trade, and, consequently, the cumulative current account balance was a positive
$3.8 billion for the period 1970-80. Since 1981, the progressively smaller balances
in services have been insufficient

to offset the increasingly negative merchandise

trade balances [15]. Table 1-1 shows the deterioration

in U. S. international

accounts during this period.
Table 1-1
U. S. World Trade Balance and
Current Account Balances
1981-1985
[Billions of U. S. Dollars)
1981

u. s.

-39.6
Source:

1982
-42.6

1983
-69.4

1984

1985

1986

-123.3

-143.8

-150

Economic Report of the President:

1986

This apparent shift from U. S.-produced goods to foreign-produced
has inflicted

goods

economic hardships on workers and producers in key sectors of

the U. S. economy.

For example, largely because of the 60 percent appreciation

of the U. S. dollar on a trade-weighted

basis, U. S. imports of capital goods rose

from $29.6 billion in 1980 to an annual rate of almost $6S billion in the first
half of 1985. Additionally,
as exports of agricultural

problems in the U. S. agricultural

sector worsened

products declined from $43.3 billion in 1981 to $30.1

billion in 198S.
The loss of competitiveness

of U. S. producers inferred

squeezed profits and the displacement of many industrial

by their severely

workers and farmers

has produced a sharp rise in _protectionist
result has been a deluge of legislation
year seeking

surcharges,

array of foreign imports.
tectionism, particularly

quotas,

sentiment in the United States.
introduced

or other

The

in Congress over the past

protectionist

measures

on a wide

The thesis of this study is that the effects of pro-

a surcharge, are so wide-ranging, complex and potentially

detrimental

that they must be clearly stated before their impacts can be estimated

individually

or in the aggregate . Thus, after a brief review of recent protectionist

legislation introduced in Congress, a theoretical analysis of contemporary

effects

of a surcharge on U. S. imports is presented.
Review of Surcharge Legislation in the United States Congress
The amount of legislation
can be construed

as indicative

introduced

in Congress in the last 18 months

of a tilt in United States trade policy toward

protectionism .

The recent trend began in February

Representatives

introduced H.R. 1139. The bill called for an immediate 20 percent

surcharge

on all U. S. imports.

1985 when the House of

To force trade partners

to open their markets

to U. S. goods, provisions were included whereby surcharges could be removed
as bilateral

free-trade

were introduced
first

areas were negotiated .

Three additional

bills

in the House during the spring of 1985. H.R. 1944 was the

and proposed

to levy a 10 percent

surcharge

encourage Japan to eliminate a variety of non-tariff
The sentiment to expand protectionist
in H.R. 2015.

surcharge

This time, proponents

on Japanese

imports

to

barriers on U. S. exports.

measures to other trading partners surf aced
argued that surcharges

on imports from

Japan and other NA TO allies should be imposed in amounts sufficient
for U. S. troops stationed in respective NATO countries.
revenues could go toward the ever-widening
2

to pay

Recognizing surcharge

gap between federal

government

expenditures

and revenues, the House introduced

H.R. 2120 in April 1985. Sur-

charges would be imposed on all imports for a two year period and would decline
from 20 percent to 10 percent over the period if federal
reduced from projected levels. H.R. 3035 introduced

budget deficits

were

in July established criteria

to impose a 25 percent surcharge on imports from countries with a large trade
surplus with the United States. At the time ' the bill was introduced,

only Japan,

Taiwan, Korea and Brazil met the criteria established in the legislation.
The U. S. Senate has also been considering legislation which would impose
import surcharges.

The Senate introduced S. 761 in March 1985. The bill called

for variable surcharge rates on imports from countries with large current account
trade surpluses with the United States.
the only country affected

Once again, Japan would have been

under the provisions of the bill in 1985. Senate bill

S. 770 targeted imports exclusively from Japan and proposed a 20 percent surcharge
on all Japanese imports. S. 906 introduced in April proposed the highest surcharge
to date - a maximum 43 percent surcharge on imports from any country that
had a substantial surplus in merchandise· trade with the United States and that
engaged in unfair trade practices.
Although Congress has not passed a bill which would specifically
surcharge

on imports, both the Senate and House have passed resolutions

overwhelming
Concurrent

impose a

majorities which could result in import surcharges.

Resolution

15 and House Concurrent

President to take retaliatory

Resolution

by

Both Senate

107 call for the

measures against Japan unless it opens its markets

to U. S. goods. It should also be noted that in May the House of Representatives
passed the Trade and International
the omnibus trade bill). Specifically,
and antidumping

Reform Act of 1986 (commonly known as
the bill would tighten countervailing

duty

rules, require countries who run large trade surpluses with the
3

United States to reduce those surpluses or face retaliation,
restrictions against countries who do not meet "internationally
rights."

and impose trade
recognized workers'

When the new Congress convenes next year, factors such as another

record U. S. trade deficit and persistent unemployment may increase the likelihood
that Congress will pass sonic type of surcharge on imports.
A Theoretical Analysis of Import Surcharges
A growing number of rationales are being offered to justify trade restrictions
and surcharges.
deficits

Proponents of a surcharge argue it will reduce United States

in both foreign trade and the federal

industries adversely affected

government

budget, aid U. S.

by competition from imports, and induce trading

partners to open their domestic markets to U. S. exports.

Protectionist

are advocated as a means to achieving two broad objectives.

measures

First, they are

intended to provide visible and immediate relief to industries experiencing severe
difficulties

and especially to their workforce.

And, secondly, they are intended

to allow ongoing adjustments to changed economic or technological circumstances.
Such admirable objectives correspond

to a concern for (and political pressure

for) employment and social equity on the one hand and to the goal of promoting
greater economic efficiency and industrial restructuring
to the complexity of the objectives,

protection

on the other. Compared

is a fairly

simple and blunt

policy instrument.
Trade protection has complex and pervasive effects throughout the economy.
The lack of transparency of the many different types of measures being considered
makes it difficult
formance indicators

to quantitatively

assess their impact on macroeconomic

and any such assessment should be treated cautiously

Nevertheless, recent empirical

per[3].

studies have estimated the aggregate effects on
4

the U. S. trade balance of a 20 percent surcharge on all imports.
Congressional

Research Service estimated

that the improvement

In 1985, the
of the trade

balance would be $19.6 billion if a 20 percent surcharge were implemented
Wharton Econometrics

and Data Resources, Inc. also presented

large-scale studies in 198~ [22] [11].

[8].

the results of

In testimony before the Senate Finance

Committee in April of last year, Professor Lawrence Klein presented the results
of the Wharton study and Robert Gavin, CEO of Motorola, presented the results
of the DRI investigation.

The Wharton study estimated an improvement in the

U. S. trade balance in the range of $11.7 billion to $21.4 billion, while Data
Resources, Inc. estimated a $54.3 billion improvement.
The effects estimated

in these studies are based primarily

on economic

theory which holds that the price mechanism is the main channel through which
countries' international

accounts are adjusted.

However, in "real world" market

economies, the actual adjustment process involves a myriad of individual,
arrived

at decisions by millions of consumers, producers

freely

and distributors

in

countries around the world, responding to gradually evolving market incentives.
The analysis which follows identifies

a broader set of factors which, at least

in part, determine the demand for exports and imports, and should be considered
in estimating the cumulative costs and benefits of protectionist measures.
Surcharge Pass-Throughs
The nominal purpose of a surcharge would be to reduce imports by increasing
their prices to residents and, thereby, encouraging

consumers to switch their

purchases from imported goods to relatively less expensive domestically produced
substitutes.

Empirical estimates of the aggregate effect of a surcharge (usually

20 percent) on the U. S. trade balance generally assume the "tax" is completely
passed through

by the sellers of imported
5

goods to the final consumers.

In

fact, the effectiveness

of a surcharge in reducing exports depends to a large

degree on the proportionality

between the tax and the price increase, i.e., the

extent to which the charge is actually passed on to ultimate

buyers.

Recent

evidence suggests that foreign suppliers have the ability to absorb a surcharge
and maintain their market shares.
The U. S. dollar appreciated
between 1980 and 1985.
pricing policy dilemma.

nearly 60 percent against OECD currencies

Obviously, foreign sellers in U. S. markets faced a
They could maintain

prices of their goods (and thus

their prof its) fixed in terms of their domestic currency

and permit prices of

their products to decline in terms of dollars in the U. S. market in an amount
directly proportional
currency.

to the appreciation

of the dollar relative to their domestic

This strategy would have led to substantially

final consumers of imported goods. Alternatively,

lower U. S. prices for

foreign sellers could maintain

U. S. dollar prices in U. S. markets and increase their profits
currency
dollar.

in proportion

of their currencies

The pricing strategy chosen by most major industrial

toward the latter option.
indicated

to the depreciation

relative to the
countries tended

A study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York

that the 59 percent appreciation

1985 led to a mere 2 percent reduction
suggests that the remainder,
higher profits.

in their own

in the U. S. dollar between 1980 and
in prices of U. S. imports [18]. This

some 57 percent, accrued to foreign producers as

Certainly, the sharp increase in profits accumulated

by foreign

sellers during the dollar's recent appreciation affords them the ability to moderate
- if not absorb - increases in the prices of their products which might result
from a surcharge.
depreciation

Such "excess" profits may partially

explain why the dollar

in recent months has not led to a rapid adjustment in the U. S. trade

balance.
6

Exchange Rates
A surcharge
price advantage

give manufacturers

would initially
over imports.

However, the initial advantage

negated by a round of secondary

adjustments.

the exchange rate response described
adjustments

in the U. S. a relative

would arise directly

Policymakers

would tend to be
should anticipate

by the economic theory of tariffs.

Such

from the free market forces unleashed

by a

surcharge [13).
If U. S. consumers shift their expenditures

away from foreign

produced

goods and toward competing domestic products, the supply of dollars flowing to
the foreign exchange markets would be reduced.

To the extent that the exchange

rate of the dollar relative

is determined

the supply-demand
supply

to other currencies

relationship

in imports attributable

to appreciate.

It follows that the larger

In addition

competing

producers,

competitiveness

to reducing

the initial

the dollar appreciation

of U. S. exporters.

price advantage
would adversely

related

markets.

of the

affect

the price

hard pressed

would receive no direct benefits

while most likely incurring

revenues and foreign

the

of U. S. import-

As exports are discouraged,

U. S. export oriented industries, e.g., agriculture,
from the surcharge

in

to a surcharge, the smaller the supply of dollars

will be to foreign exchange markets - and the greater the appreciation
dollar.

by

in the foreign exchange market, a reduction

would cause the dollar

reduction

continuously

further

reductions

in export-

In the final analysis, the response of

exchange rates to a surcharge would tend to remove entirely the positive tradebalance effect of a surcharge [21).
The complexity of current
of the foregoing

analysis.

U. S. trade problems belies the simplistic

The dramatic

increase

in the annual

logic

trade deficit

from $25 billion to $144 billion between 1980 and 1985 is related to the sharp

7

rise in the value of the dolla~ over that period.

However, the decline in the

U. S. dollar since March 1985, which was accelerated
and four foreign governments,

has not resulted in the reduction

trade deficit suggested by conventional
has continued

by the U. S. government

wisdom.

in the U. S.

In fact, the U. S. trade deficit

to increase -and by mid-year 1986 rose to an annual rate of $150

billion [ 1OJ.
The rising U. S. trade deficit

by a phenomenon known as the "J curve" effect.

been influenced

"J curve" literature

currency

is primarily

devaluations,

trade policy.
ramifications

recorded in recent months has, assuredly,

concerned

Although the

with the trade balance impact of

the theory has relevant

implications

It should also be noted that the predicted

for a surcharge

effect

has political

as the mettle of politically accountable policymakers may be seriously

tested if protectionist

measures do not produce immediate,

visible benefits for

constituents [4].
The evidence on devaluation

and trade balances suggests that a worsening

of the trade balance is usually observed over the period of time immediately
following a devaluation.
a positive improvement

However, over a longer period of time a swing toward
in the trade balance is expected.

not have the exact impact of a devaluation
surcharge would not automatically

A surcharge

on the trade balance because a

increase the flow of dollars to foreign producers

as a result of higher import prices.

However, the time necessary to improve

the trade balance with a surcharge would be analogous to the adjustment
hypothesized

by the "J curve.•

slowly to either a devaluation
commodity
higher price.

would

period

Consumers and producers generally would adjust
or a surcharge.

It is only after

is placed on the shelves that consumers

an imported

can reject it due to its

Since it takes purchasers time to recognize a changed competitive
8

condition

and make adjustments,

there is a production-response
adjustments in new shipments.

a consumer-response
lag as pre-existing

lag is inevitable.

contracts

might not permit

Until orders can be canceled or reduced, shipments

may continue to arrive, thus raising the value of imports and frustrating
makers.

Further, additional

manufacturing

Also,

policy-

time is required to phase out production and reduce

capacity.

That the adjustment of exports and imports to relative price changes occurs
only slowly over time has been found in many studies.
Rhomberg found in a sample of 13 industrial
to relative

A study by Junz and

countries that the trade response

price changes took up to five years, with only 50 percent of the

full effect occurring in the first three years [16). In societies that pursue instant
gratification,

lengthy adjustment

periods would be perceived as policy failures

which would necessitate further legislative efforts and could further

exacerbate

trade problems.
Surcharges, Employment Protection and Modernization
The worldwide

slowdown in economic growth and consequent

persistent

high level of unemployment has increased the pressure on governments to attenuate
the speed of structural

adjustment

and the rate of job losses.

It appears that

surcharges would have only a limited positive impact on U. S. employment in
the protected sectors. To begin with, in the sectors most directly in competition
with foreign suppliers, trade flows are usually a fairly minor determinant
employment

levels.

Also, unless surcharges

of

are applied to all imports, trade

diversion may result in a very limited impact on import volumes.
Table 10-1 conveys a noted misconception, namely manufacturing

employment

declined over the decade 1974-1984 as a result of an increase in import penetration
9

in the manufacturing

sector.

result of a trade deficit
much additional
productivity,

Further analysis suggests this outcome is not the

and that a surcharge

would be unlikely

to provide

employment in the sector. Column S, denoting changes in labor

provides a compelling answer to the question of why employment

has declined in manufacturing

between 1974-1984 - productivity

has increased

27.9 percent over the period.
Table 10-1
Manufacturing Sector Indicators
1974-84

Import
Penetration
Year (percent)l

Industrial
Production Employment
(1977-=100) (thousands )2

Productivity
(1977-100)3

Average
Hourly
Earnings
(dollars)4

Real Net Capital
Stock (billions
1982 dollars)5

1974

7.2

92.6

20,077

90.6

4.42

581.1

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

6.5
6.7
6.9
7.8
7.9

83.4
91.9
100.0
107.1
111.5

18,323
18,997
19,682
20,505
21,040

92.9
97.1
100.0
101.5
101.4

4.83
5.68

597.2
612.5
630.5

6.17
6.70

655.1
681.4

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

8.2
8.5

108.2
110.5
102.2
110.2
123.9

20,285

101.4

20,170
18,781

7.27
7.99

18,434

103.6
105.9
112.9

19,412

118.5

707.2
729.7
741.3
741.1
752.9

8.9
9.3
10.9

5.22

8.49
8.83
9.18

I Imports as percent of manufacturers' shipments plus imports minus exports; based on
value data.
2All employees; establishment data.
3Output per hour of all persons.
4For production workers.
5End of year. Based on data to be published in Survey of Current Business.
Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of the Census),
Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics), and Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
Manufatturing

employment may well continue

to decline as productivity

grows and average hourly earnings rise. (Average hourly earnings for production
10

workers increased nearly 108 percent over the period).

This decline in sectoral

employment should not be construed as an inability of U. S. producers to compete
internationally

and a mandate

Rather it is indicative

for surcharges

or other restrictive

measures.

of a process whereby U. S. producers can become more

efficient, economically pr~fitable, and gain a competitive advantage over foreign
producers.
If import surcharges increase domestic producers' share of the home market,

resources available for industrial

adjustment will increase.

The improved cash

flow provides the opportunity for domestic firms to modernize plants and equipment, to underwrite

the costs of involvement in adjusting capacity to demand,

and/or to diversify into more promising areas of activity.

The increased profita-

bility resulting from protection may even encourage foreign producers to engage
in joint ventures with domestic firms.
competitive

However, protection

pressures and, given the substantial

petuates technical and economic inefficiency.
effect

normally reduces

costs adjustment

Furthermore,

may be that the economic rents. created

entails, per-

the most execrable

by protectionist

measures in

industries with low entry barriers simply attract new labor and capital resources
as well as additional

entrepreneurial

talent.

The widely sought after protection
hasten, the much needed structural
rubber footwear industry

of a surcharge

adjustment

stands to delay, not

in several industries.

is an excellent case in point.

The non-

The industry received

temporary protection under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 for the purpose
of promoting adjustment
marketing

agreements

to a loss of competitiveness

internationally.

Orderly

were negotiated

with Taiwan and Korea to limit their

shipments to allow for a revitalization

of the U. S. industry [10). Despite the

reduction in imports, no increase in real investment to retool the industry occurred
11

and labor productivity

declined.

Not surprisingly

the import

relief

did not

allow most segments of the industry to become competitive with foreign producers,
particularly

the leading developing country exporters, who have cost differentials

on the order of 5 or 6 to I.
As Table 12-1 indicates, employment generally decreased in the last decade
but not monotonically.
Table 12-1
Manufacturing
Import Penetration
{12er£entll

Sector Indicators:
1974-84

Textiles

Apparel

Real Output
(billions
of 1982
dollars)2

1974

4.3

7.6

28.2

2,328

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

3.6
3.8
3.7
4.3
4.1

8.3
10.3
10.0
12.1
12.4

27.3
31.0
34.4
35.1
35.7

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

4.3
4.9
4.6
4.7

12.9
13.8
13.9
15.4
20.2

36.2
36.l
33.7
37.3
38.5

Year

6.1

Textiles and Apparel

Apparel

Real Net
Capital Stock
(billions of
1982 dollars )5

80.7

88.5

26.8

2,111
2,237
2,227
2,231
2,189

89.6
91.8
100.0
102.3
104.8

94.5
94.5
100.0
104.2
98.1

26.6
26.5
26.7
26.9
26.8

~.111
2,067
1,911
1,905
1,943

104.7
106.6
113.7

97.3
103.6
111.0

26.7
26.3
25.6
24.6
24.3

Productivity
(1277 -= 1QQ}4

Employment
(thousands)3

Textiles

llmports as percent of manufacturers' shipments plus imports minus exports; based on value
data; 1984 estimated.
2Real gross domestic product.
3All employees; establishment data.
4Output per hour of all employees; based on unpublished data from Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
5End of year. Based on data to be published in Surveyof CurrentBusiness.
The advanced technology which is being introduced
ancillary

operations,

such as cutting and grading.

is being implemented

in the

However, the stitching opera-

tions which account for 80 percent of value added are most likely to remainat least in the medium

term - highly labor intensive.
12

Thus, in fragmented,

labor-intensive

industries,

for profit-enhancing

like clothing and footwear, there is a limited scope

substitution

of capital for labor, and protection

unlikely to be able to reduce cost differentials

between the industrialized

appears
nations

and the major developing nation exporters ( l 7).
Proponents

of surcharges

and other protectionist

measures suggest that

the scope for improving or regaining competitive advantage is greatest in oligopolistic industries

[21). The logic is that since competition

in such industries

depends on economics of scale, technology and product differentiation,

protection

will encourage firms to use resources for adjustment and restructuring

programs.

The United States automobile industry and various segments of the EEC steel
industry

arc offered

as prominent

examples of such a process.

Once again,

however, it must be noted that a variety of factors may impede adjustment.
Specifically,

import surcharges

make it difficult

signals, and

for domestic producers to accurately determine long-term costs

and establish capital investment
the long-term

distort market price and quantity

in creating

plans.

persistent

Even if protection

was successful over

rents, domestic producers

benefit less than expected as profits encourage new entrants,
companies, to seek a share of the protected market.

arc likely to

including foreign

In summary, protectionism

is unlikely to provide the type of permanent restoration of competitive advantage
envisioned by advocates in either large or small scale industries.
Selective Surcharges and Trade Diversion
Both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate considered legislation
in 1985 which would impose a 20 percent surcharge on imports from Japan .
Such a measure could be expected

to generate

pervasive

trade diversion

imports from Japan are replaced by imports from other suppliers.
13

as

Consequently,

while the U. S. bilateral

trade balance with Japan would improve, the overall

improvement in the U. S. trade balance would probably be modest.
Table 14-1 shows the increase in imports by OECD countries and the United
States from five major east Asian developing countries
the total value imported· by the U. S. and percentage
increased significantly

Both

from 1979-1984.

change in real terms

over the period.
Table 14-1
Total OECD Imports From
Five Major East-Asian NICs 1979-84
$ US billion -

Singapore
Korea
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Malaysia
Total
of which
imported by

u. s.

1984

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

5.1
10.8
11.9
10.2
8.3
46.2

7.0
11.1
13.8
12.3
9.2
53.4

6.6
12.5
15.2
12.6
7.7
. 54.6

6.6
12.7
15.6
12.2
7.2
54.2

6.9
14.6
13.3
7.7
60.8

18.1
23.7
15.5
10.1
76.0

17.6

20.4

23.0

24.1

29.7

39.8

11.6
14.3

17.5

18.4

8.6

Percentage
Annual rate of
change in
real terms 2
Total

u. s.

6.3
6.4

2.2
14.0

28.8

For 1984, based · on data for the first three quarters.
Volume of imports: values deflated by the export price index of
manufactures.
OECD Foreign Trade Statistics
Source:
1.

2.

14

i

29.4
'42.1

It should be pointed out that trade diversion

where a multiplicity
and footwear

of potential sources exist and in industries such as clothing

where trade is highly responsive to price and quantity

However, in recent years as multinational
opportunities

occurs most often in industries

enterprises

signals.

have taken advantage

of

to shift pro~uction sites, trade diversion has resulted in previously

less mobile industries, such as steel and consumer electronics.

The 1977 Orderly

Market Agreement (OMA) for color television receivers between Japan and the
U. S. is an example of this phenomenon.

At the time of the agreement, the

OECD reports the U. S. imported 90 percent of completed TV receivers from
Japan.

Two years after the OMA, Japan's share of the U.S. market had declined

to 50 percent.

However, during this period the East-Asian countries, shown in

the table above, increased
Currently it is anticipated
with Japan is affecting

their share of the market from 15 to 50 percent.
that the Voluntary Export Agreement for automobiles

a similar result.

Imports by the U. S. from Korea and

Yugoslavia are increasing as Japan's import penetration remains relatively constant
resulting in a negative impact on the trade deficit (6).
Reaction Abroad
No analysis of the impact of an import surcharge would be complete without
taking into consideration

the reaction in the rest of the world.

As the largest

trading nation, the United States exerts a strong influence on economic developments in virtually

every nation in the world.

These nations'

United States represent, in many instances, a significant
economic activity.
to continue
abroad,

exports to the

portion of their total

For that reason, a real or a perceived threat to their capacity

to export would no doubt draw a quick reaction.

such measures

represent

restrictions
15

on foreign

Viewed from

countries'

exports.

Since the measures are expected to reduce employment and profits in foreign
industries,

the governments of our trading partners will be pressured to impose

restrictions

on imports from the U. S. A sample of what such a reaction might

be was provided by the governing supranational
Community, the European Parliament,
calling for immediate

retaliatory

amount if the U. S. government

body of the European Economic

which passed a resolution in March 1985

action against U. S. exports in an equivalent
were to institute

a surcharge

on the exports

[5].

Even modest increases in protectionist

measures elicit foreign

In 1984 when the U. S. tightened its rules for determining

responses.

the country of origin

of imports, the Chinese reduced their purchase of U. S. agricultural
retaliation.

Other nations would, no doubt, respond similarly;

action would deal a further
both industrial

blow to already

and agricultural

the surcharge to significantly
retaliation

products.

hard-pressed

exports in

their collective

U. S. exporters

Given the questionable

of

capacity of

reduce U. S. imports, the likely export-reducing

abroad could result in an actual worsening of the U. S. trade balance

from what it would have been without a surcharge.
For others, particularly

the developing nations whose "retaliatory

leverage"

against the United States might be rather small because they import little from
us but who nevertheless

rely heavily on exports to the United States for badly

needed earnings of foreign exchange, the surcharge could pose grave difficulties.
This could be particularly

true of the group of developing

America and elsewhere that in recent years have had difficulty
international
A further

debt obligations
impairment

to the U. S. and other industrial

nations

in Latin

in meeting their
nations' banks.

of their capacity to earn the dollars needed to service

16

their debt could, in some instances, lead to their default--with

possibly disastrous

consequences for some of the industrial world's banks.
Conclusion
The indirect

nature, of the link between the instrument

of a surcharge

and the policy target of improving the U. S. trade deficit, along with employment
and profits, has been emphasized in this paper. A theoretical

economic analysis

of contemporary scenarios pointed out the probable ineffectiveness
on U. S. imports.

of surcharges

After examining the failure of the pass-through, the offsetting

effects of exchange rates, the impact of trade diversion, and the possibility of
retaliation,

it is reasonable

to expect a much smaller potential

U. S. trade deficit than is hoped for by advocates of surcharges.
of the impact of protectionist
macroeconomic

variables

impact on the
Future estimates

measures on the U. S. trade balance and other

should

consider

measurements.

17

such

important

factors

in their
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